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E C H O  
 
I want to draw together a series of threads that I have been unravelling in encountering the 
presentations of Kathy Cleland and Mari Velonaki. The tense is here that of a future anterior, 
of what I will have encountered as anticipation, an echo without an originary voice. In this it 
follows something of the temporality of the echo, or at least a temporality I would want to 
explore concerning an echo without an origin. But, let’s commence with mirrors and what 
can and cannot be done with and to them. We go to the source, so to speak, to the Model 
endlessly repeated, to Plato’s Republic, Book X, Section 596: 
 
But how would it be if there were a man who produced everything that every single 
other craftsman is able to make?  That would be a man of enormous power, uncanny 
and astonishing.  In fact, there is such a man: he produces everything and anything.  
He can produce not only implements, but also what comes forth from the earth, 
producing plants and animals and everything else; and indeed himself too, and 
besides that, earth and sky, even the gods, and everything in the heavens and in the 
underworld.  But such a producer, standing above all beings and even above the gods, 
would be a sheer wonderworker!  Yet there is such a demiourgos, and he is nothing 
unusual; each of us is capable of achieving such production.  It is all a matter of 
observing in what way he produces. 
 
And what tropos is that, which makes possible a production that is capable of 
producing anything and everything?  Such a tropos presents no difficulties: by means 
of it one can go ahead and produce things everywhere and without delay.  But you can 
do it quickest if you just take a mirror and point it around in all directions.  
 
We understand in this dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon that Plato has really scored 
his point with the example of the mirror, going to the heart of his Doctrine of Forms and 
understanding of mimesis. We are, no doubt, already familiar with Plato’s three “makers,” 
that of the ideal form as model (the gods); that of the artifact as copy (the artisan) and that of 
the copy of the copy, the image (the artist). We are aware of Plato’s denigration of the artist as 
the one leading us from the truth, and the artisan’s artifact being a shadow of the Idea.  And 
then there is the other dangerous mirror-story, that of Narcissus and the reflected image. The 
mirror so far, it seems, is anything but virtuous. 
 
There is another story implicating Narcissus, that of Echo: For having tricked the goddess 
Juno, Echo is punished by losing the capacity for original speech, only being able to repeat 
the last words she heard. On encountering Narcissus, and wanting to seduce him, Echo is 
repelled by the youth who retreats into his own self-enclosing gaze saying “I would die 
before I would give you a chance at me.” Echo can only repeat endlessly the last of his words: 
“I give you a chance at me.” Then her metamorphosis (this is one of Ovid’s stories after all): 
 
  Her body dries and shrivels till voice only 
  And bones remain, and then she is voice only 
  For the bones are turned to stone. She hides in the woods 
  And no one sees her now along the mountains, 
  But all may hear her, for her voice is living 
 
Death of the living voice or life of the dead voice, there are other versions of this encounter 
that moves between a scene of seduction, a mirror of reflection and a Dionysian 
dismemberment and scattering. The most complex account is that by Pierre Klossowski 
concerning Diana at her Bath. With Klossowski we engage two lines of complication to the 
Platonic model and copy, one in a direction most fully explored by Gilles Deleuze with 
respect to his understanding of simulacra and the other in a direction opened initially by 
Martin Heidegger in his reading of the passage from Plato we have already cited, aimed not 
at the denigration of mimesis but rather at the question of making. 
 
We will approach the second one first. In Plato’s text, just after the passage we cited there is 
something of a cesura or break, a kind of breaking off of the text dealing with the Model, the 
Copy and the Image. Plato will move to another trio, that of the user, the maker and the artist 
While the maker produces an artifact from an ideal form, this same maker needs to take 
advice from someone who uses what is made in order to make correctly. What is at stake is 
not a denigration of mimesis as a false copying, but a grappling with the tropos of making, the 
manner of making such that the Idea produces itself as present.  The mirror image of the sun 
reflected in its surface is a producing of the sun, but it is not the producing of the eidos.  The 
question becomes how does the outward appearance of an Idea (that is Being) reveal itself 
except through its appearing through something else, either through the wood of this 
particular bed frame (Platos example), or the painting of this bed frame or the reflection of 
this bed frame?  The Platonic dialogue will conclude that Being, the pure outward 
appearance of bedframeness for example, is an eidos not seen by virtue of any medium.  It is 
not produced, nor found in the mediums of things produced.  It is given in the revealing of 
the whatness of beings, and crucially, the orientation or turning of the making to this giving 
is what is crucial. 
 
But how would this making proceed if not by model and copy, if not from the recognition of 
identity to that of difference as that which differs in identity? How would “making” proceed 
as tropos, as a way of being, if not by eidos and mimesis? Deleuze presents us with a 
proposition concerning two distinct readings of the world. One invites us to think difference 
from the standpoint of a previous similitude or identity. The other thinks similitude or 
identity as the product of a deep disparity. The first defines the world of copies and 
representations, the world as icon. The second defines the world of simulacra, world as 
phantom. Difference occupies the centre of a decentered system. The first tells the story of 
Narcissus, the second makes sense of Echo. Klossowski’s Diana at her Bath infinitely 
complicates these two worlds, a choice between them or the movements from one to the 
other.  What Deleuze learns from Plato is the Nietzschean project of the overturning of 
Platonism. Plato will emphasise that the simulacrum is not a degraded copy. Rather, it denies 
the very distinction between original and copy, model and representation and in this sense 
undermines the whole Doctrine of Forms. Hence, it cannot simply be equated with the false 
copy of the artist Simulation is the phantom itself, the false as a power. Deleuze suggests that 
for Klossowski Being is the simulacrum whereby the same and the similar are produced. 
Though, we need to emphasise that the artificial is not the simulacrum; rather, they are 
opposed. To invoke the artificial is already to return to a Platonism of the copy of the copy.  
 
Let us say something about Klossowski’s reading of the myth of Diana. Diana is an Olympian 
deity, at times coinciding with Artemis. She is the huntress with silver bow (a lunar figure) 
and silver arrows who in taking on human form hunts deer for the Cyclops and Hercules in 
an eternal return that moves from the hunt to bathing to Olympus and again to the hunt. 
Actaeon is human, a hunter with his hounds whose desire is to catch Diana bathing. As a 
goddess, Diana is not visible, so what is it that Actaeon strives to see?  Diana bathes, not 
because she is exhausted from the hunt but to return to the serene uselessness of Olympus. 
Actaeon wears a stag’s head in order to snare Diana.  The pool, site of bathing and Acteon’s 
aim at seduction forever offers the scope of reflection. But here is Klossowski’s complexity: 
 
Of course, invisible Diana, while contemplating Actaeon as he is imagining her, 
muses on her own body; yet this body, in which she will manifest herself to herself, 
she actually borrows from Acteon’s imagination. Diana could have chosen some 
other visible form: doe, bear or, assuming she wanted to manifest her principle, some 
form that would have terrified Actaeon and kept him at a distance. But on the 
contrary, adorable as a goddess, she wants to be adorable also as a woman, in a body 
which, once seen, will excite the passions of mortal man.  
 
For Klossowski, there is a daemon as intermediary that is Actaeon’s imagination and Diana’s 
mirror. The daemon is constitutive of simulacra, existing between the immortal serenity of 
gods and the mortal passions of humans, which is to say both passionate and immortal This 
passionate immortality would be Klossowski’s understanding of Being, as the simulacrum 
that in an eternal return opens a recognition of the beings that are. How does this play out? 
Diana bathes to purge the images that the name “Diana” calls forth for Actaeon: mortality, 
passion and blood. At the same moment Actaeon needs to shed his hunter’s mentality for 
Diana to approach the pool to wash. The stag’s head he wears must have the virtue of 
inciting him to an authentic act at the moment of pure imposture. And this is the power of 
the simulacra and the hidden origin of the virtual, as it is located not in the point of view of 
the false copy of a mirror, nor even in an ideal model that would guide a pro-ducing, but in 
the point of view of the virtue of the authenticity of contrivance. It is Actaeon who is required 
to take on the very transparency of the pool in which Diana is to bath. 
 
As it transpires, Actaeon by chance, which is to say by accident, encounters Diana 
unexpectedly at her bath. She, startled by his appearance, covers herself with one hand and 
with the other splashes water in his eye to obscure his vision, while uttering: “Now you may 
tell you saw me here unclothed / If you can tell at all.” And, simultaneously, she turns him 
into a stag which his own hounds immediately ravage and decimate.  
 
There is a complication of becomings emphasized in this account that cannot be quite 
unraveled by separating out the actants from the field or scene of the action. Rather the 
phantasms of simulation, expressed for Klossowski in the daemon, are at once neither a 
distribution of forms and representations, along the lines of mimesis or similitude. Nor are 
they a play of signifying elements premised on a radical absence. It would not be the case of a 
radical misrecognition nor the insistence of the letter in the unconscious. Rather, we might 
begin to recognize along the contours of this daemon, a way of considering the notion of 
avatar as it has been activated in contemporary discourses on digital contrivances. 
 
As most of you would already know, “avatar” originates in Hindu myth. It is a Sanskrit 
compound of ava connoting “down” and t’r connoting “to pass over”; hence translated as 
“descent.” It seems to have first entered the English language in 1784, with the implied 
meaning of the descent of a divinity to earth in an incarnate form. One may immediately 
think here, for example, of Diana at her Bath. This date suggests that we could not separate 
the arrival of the word outside of a European expansion to the East, a colonialism that by 
1859 will find in the expression “avatar” something of its own simulation: “manifestation or 
presentation to the world as a ruling power or object of worship.”  By 1880 it had taken a 
broader reading of “manifestation or display.”   Though we recognize this word activates a 
terrain that is immersively digital, we also recognize the extent to which the oldest concerns 
themselves activate the most current terrain of the avatar. It is still the circular engagements 
with appearance and reality, as if Plato did not put it to rest, or Kant, or Hegel, or Heidegger, 
Deleuze or Derrida. There is truly something that will not rest in the face of more than 
enough extraordinary accounting for the conundrum of seeing and saying. The digital avatar 
is merely another genesis in the impassability of this question. We might yet approach it 
again from the point of view of a curious conversion or crossing of meanings that first made 
their appearance in Eurocentric cultures around the 14th century. I am referring to the 
convergence of ingenium and machina. 
 
We understand machine, in its earliest meanings to refer to a contrivance, indeed, to be able, 
and in this sense related closely to the proximity of techne and tropos, where tropos concerns a 
question of orientation and turning, how in the process of making one maintains oneself, 
applies oneself, to what one ties oneself or binds oneself in making. How does one belong to 
one’s making? Techne concerns a knowhow in making. By the 14th century it would come to 
mean a structure of any kind, material or immaterial. By the 17th century, its emphasis 
became that of the suppression of manual labour. Engine is derived from ingenium, initially 
referring to a “native talent” or genius, an actual disposition or temper. It moved to 
emphasising the human skill in contriving, ingenuity but also artfulness, cunning and 
trickery, also machination in the sense of contrivance. By the 14th century it began to refer to 
the instance or product of ingenuity, artifice, contrivance or device. By the 15th century, it 
became a mechanical contrivance, a machine, implement or tool.  
 
We may trace via a series of genealogies the coming apart of the human and the machine, on 
the one hand from a simple etymological engagement with the emergence in the 14th century 
of an instrumental question of the world. Equally we could appeal to Heidegger’s work on 
technology and the radical departure from a Greek understanding of poesis as a bringing 
forth or revealing of Being in a work where the essence of techne is this revealing as a 
belonging of human being to Being. Heidegger will contrast this with modernity’s 
production as a challenging forth that reveals the severance or oblivion of a belonging of 
human being and Being in the standing reserve of whatever is for production. In this sense, 
the question of the human and machine, perhaps activated by recognition of the avatar as 
phantasm opens a relation between ingenium and machina that will not repeat the circular 
paradox of appearance and reality but will reveal the virtuous as the greatest number of 
simulacra. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
